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By Jill R. Horwjtz 
The following is based on testimony delivered before the 
U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means 
on M y  26,2005 
M r. Chairman, in its review of the tax-exempt sector, this committee has heard many distinguished witnesses 
discuss the legal requirements governing nonprofit organizations, 
the advantages that come with nonprofit status, and whether 
nonprofit organizations provide sufficient public benefits to j u s q  
these advantages. These are particularly important questions far 
the hospital industry, where for-profit, nonprofit, and government 
hospitals operate side by side. 
I will discuss two questions about the implications of the 
mix of hospital types: First, do different types of hospitals act 
differently? Second, are there sigdicant competitive issues raised 
by having different hospital types competing in the same market 
together? 
of hospital ownership have examined financial meamre's, and 
have found little difference among hospital types. For example, 
research has shown that nonprofit s d  for-profit hospitals are quite 
similar in their costs, sources of capital, exercise of market power 
and adoption of certain types oftechnology. Although for-profit 
hospitals pay higher wages and offer incentives to top managers, 
nonprofits are increasingly using performance-based pay as well. 
Finally, during the early 1990s, for-profit hospitals and nonprofits 
had similar margins, although for-profit margins were higher than 
those of nonprofits by the late 1990s. There is some evidence that in 
the most recent years the average nonprofit hospital had a negative 
income pm~admission, while the average for-profit had a positive 
income per admission. 
Such financial tneasures, however, provide an incomplete picture 
Medical service provision 
Underlying many of the policy questions about the legal 
treatment of nonprofit hospitals is one basic issue: Do they act the 
same as for-profit hospitals - and if not, what are the differences 
and are they big enough to matter? 
There are good reasons to expect hospitals of different 
ownership status to act alike. They all share common goals of 
treating sick people; they all employ large numbers of doctors and 
nurses, using medical technology; they contract with the same 
employers and insurance companies, and are subject to the same 
health care regulations. Superficially, they resemble each other so 
much that a patient admitted to a hospital is unlikely to be able to 
tell whether it is a for-profit or a nonprofit. 
However, whether you find differences between nonprofit and 
for-profit hospitals depends on where you look. Most studies 
of a hospital. Because they are first and foremost providers of care 
for the sick and injured, to evaluate whether nonprofit hospitals earn 
their keep we must also know how hospitals differ in the medical care 
they provide. 
In my research on medical services, I have found large, Bystem- 
atic, and long-standing differences among hospitalltypes. For-profit 
hospitals are more likely than their nonprofit counterparts to offer 
the most profitable services, and less likely than either nonprofits 
or government hospitals to offer services that are unprofitable yet 
valuable, even essential. 
I will offer a few examples. Psychiatric emergency care is 
considered an extremely unprofitable service, both because of 
low reimbursements and because its patients tend to be poor and 
uninsured. Comparing hospitals that are similar in terms of size, 
teaching status, location, and market characteristics, for-profit 
hospitals were seven percentage points less likely than nonprofits 
and 15 percentage points less likely than government hospitals to 
offer psychiatric emergency services. 
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SOURCE: Jill Horwtz ,  "Making Profi'ts and Providing Care: Comparing Nonprofit, hr-Profit, 
and Government Hospitals,"Health Affairs, v.23, n .3  (2005): 7 9 0 - 8 0 1 .  
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Compare these results to open heart surgery, a service so 
profitable that it is often referred to as the hospital's "revenue 
center." For-profit hospitals are over seven percentage points more 
likely than similar nonprofit hospitals and 1 3 percentage points 
more likely than goverpent hospitals to provide open-heart 
surgery. 
OPEN HEART SURGERY 
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Perhaps what is most striking about for-profit hospitals is 
how strongly and quickly they respond to changes in financial 
incentives. The best illustration of this comes from a set of post- 
acute care services, such as home health care and skilled nursing 
services, whose profitability changed sharply over time. These 
services became highly profitable in the early 1990s, then reversed 
and became less profitable with the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. All 
three types of hospitals increased their offerings of home health 
care when it became profitable, but for-profits did so to a striking 
degree. From 1988 to 1996, the probability of a for-profit hospital 
offering home health services more than tripled - from 17.5 
percent to 60.9 percent. During the same period, nonprofit and 
government hospitals increased their investment at a much lower 
rate (nonprofits went from 40.9 to 5 1.7 percent, government 
hospitals went from 38.1 to 5 1.9 percent). When these services 
became unprofitable, for-profits were also quick to exit the 
market, roughly five times quicker than nonprofits.This finding 
provides evidence that for-profits move quickly and strongly in 
response to financid incentives. I 
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In sum, for-profit and nonprofit hospitals act quite 
differently. For-profit hospitals are considerably more responsive 
to financial incentives than nonprofits, not just with respect to 
their decisions to offer services but also in their willingness to 
operate at all. Under financial pressure, for-profit hospitals are 
more likely to close or restructure than nonprofits. 
The most important aspect of these findings is that nonprofits 
are more willing than for-profits to offer services even though 
they happen to be unprofitable. These services include not 
just psychiatric emergency care, but also child and adolescent 
psychiatric care, AIDS treatment, alcohol and drug treatment, 
u a  = emergency rooms, trauma services, and obstetric care. 
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There are a few clear implications of these finchgs for 
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the question of wh&er nonprofits p-de duable benefit9 
to society. First, if the mix of medical serviqes available in a 
commdty is strongly determined by the profitability of the 
services, dhis is potentially wMisomc for all patients - rich 
and poor, insured and &wed. Patients need what they need, 
aepending on their medical condition, not ~n the pr!ce of a 
, I  
seryice. Even rich and insured patien& sometimes. need iqvl- ' 
that are unprofitable for hospitals to offer. 
' 
As I noted above, noqprofits an more likely to o a r  a trauma 
center than br-profit hospigs with similar characteristiics. One 
hopes never to be in a serious car crash. But su rv i~ r s  more 
likely close to a trauma center if the accident takes place just 
outkide a nonprofit hospital. 
Second, extreme respons,ive~&s to h c i a l  incentives a n  be 
quite costly to the government. M d m e  spendhg per patiept 
and increases in s p A g  rates a r e k h r  in for-profit hospital 
markets than others. (SE~ E. Mmmmn, J. Skinner, and E. Fisher, 
'The Association Between k=-&fit Hospital Ownership and 
Increased Medicare Spmdmg," New ~ n g l r j & u r n d  $Medicine, 
341, no. 6 [1999]: 420.)This can be explained by investments 
such as home health. For example, duringthat period of ramped 
up provision of home hdth care services, home h d t h  visits per 
Medicare beneficiary increased by nearly a factor of seven, aod 
payments for services b d o o d .  Government spendmg 
on post-a- cue went &om three percent of Medicare hospital 
payments to 26 percent. This kcrease was not patients getting, ' 
better care, but hspitals doible-dipping - receiving two reim- 
bursements for the same treatment. 
Perhaps more troubling is evidence that the relative respomive- 
ness to finand incentives has led to fraudulent billing through 
a practice known as "up-coding." Up-coding occurs when a 
hospital BhikS a patient's clmpsis to one that receives higher 
reimbursement from Medicare. k r  example, a hospital v y  
label a case of pneumonia as a case of pneumonia with conplica- 
tions, at increased cost to the government of about $2,000 per 
discharge. Although all types of hospitals have done tbis, for-profit 
hospitals have done this more than nonprofit hospitals. (See E. 
Silvnman and J. Skinner, ''Medime Up-coding and Hospital 
Ownership," J o w a l  o f H c P h  Economics 23 [2004]: 369-389.) 
Moreover, up-codmg is co+giow. Nonprofit haspitah are more 
likely to up-code when they have for-profit hospital neighbors 
than when they do not. 
As a final point on differences in hospital behavior, let me say a 
word about charity m. Over the past 50 years, the legal require- 
menu for nonprofit hospitals seeking tax exemption hnn inmk- 
in& shifted from mmow requirements that hoapihLs r e k  
poverty to broader demomtm.tiom of chitable benefit.Yet, 
public attention to the provision of what ie called ucharitable care" 
 ha^ remained mbust. Whetha nonprofit and for-prdit hospitals 
m e r  in their prwision of charity r u e  is daficult to say - in 
large part because what is typidly meamred is o v d u n o m -  
pensated care. Uncompensated care provided by hospitals repre- 
sents items that most of us would not consider charitable. These 
include bills left unpaid by patients who have the ability to pay 
or d(sc0unts to insurance companies. Given these measurement 
dSculties, credible evidence shows that hospital types do not 
I differ much in the provision of uncompensated care. Even these 
results are hard to interpret because for-profit hospitals locate 
in relatively better-insured areas. My main point in disrarsing 
charity care is thittalth0ugh free care for those who are unable to 
afford it is important, other Merences - in services, in quality, 
in medical innovation - are valuable to all members of society. 
too much health care. This argument implies that the health care 
provided by nonprofit hospitals is too cheap. The idea that h d t h  
care is too inexpensive is generally not of great concern, particu- 
larly when annual medical inflation rates are back on the rise at 4 
percent per year. 
The best evidence shows that nonprofit hospitals, rather than 
using their financial savings to offset inefficient management 
or lower prices to drive for-profit competitors out of business, 
provide unprofitable and essential services that are valuable to 
society. These come not only in the form of more valuable medical 
services like trauma care, but also in training physicians and 
nurses. It is the vigorous competition among nonprofit hospitals 
that has produced virtually all the medical innovations on which 
we rely. Imagine where we would be without the first smdlpox 
vaccination developed at the nonprofit Harvard Medical School or 
the first brain surgery at Johns H o p h .  We can thank nonprofits 
for robotic surgery, pacemakers, artificial skin, kidney transplants, 
and new technology to save premature infants. Finally, along with 
I the competition among nonprofit hospitals, having for-profits in 
Hospital competition 
Do nonprofit hospitals have anti-competitive effects, or 
represent unfair &&petition to for-profits? The arguments 
about competition boil down to the idea that the nonprofit tax 
exemption is either unfair or distortionary. An older gGeration 
of research claimed, fpr example, that the tax exemption gives 
nonprofits an extra financial boost that makes it di.Ecult for for- 
profits to compete. Newer research has dismissed this notion by 
demonstrating that income tax exemptions do not lower input 
prices. Furthermore, as an empirical matter, if there were anti- 
competitive effects we would not see mixed markets with both 
for-profit and nonpmfit'hospitds, but we do. 
Some argue that nonprofits are less efficient than for-profits 
and are able to stay in business because they use their surpluses, 
including tax savings, to offset higher production costs. This idea, 
too, has little foundation. In determining whether an o r e -  
tian is efficient, it is centrally important to answer the question 
"&cient.at what?" For-profits are more efficient at earning 
profits. In the hospital sector, we care about efficiency in providing 
health care. Overall, empirical evidence Jhows no appreciable 
differences in efficiency at providing health care between for- 
proft and nonprofit hospitals. 
A M idea is that tax savings lead nonprofits to produce 
too many goods of too little value. That is, nonprofits use their 
financial savings to lower costs and. therefore, patients will buy 
the mix provides another dimension of competition, competition 
between organizational types. 
An important lesson of the research I have summarized today 
is that what you find depends on where you look. If you look at 
financial behavior, you will find few differences that j,ustify tax 
exemption. If you look at medid treatment, you will find some 
striking differences of the sort that need to be included in any 
thorough discussion of nonprofit benefits. 
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